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Abstract 
Despite the fact that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) is overburdened and 
struggling to meet the needs of taxpayers, Congress continues to add to IRS responsibilities 
in areas that appear far removed from the agency’s core revenue raising function.  The 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) is a commonly cited example of the non-revenue raising 
regulatory roles the IRS is increasingly asked to play, to the criticism of many.  After 
providing an historical overview of the IRS’s involvement in health care regulation, the 
article provides a partial defense of the expanded role that the IRS has been given as a 
result of the ACA.  The article concludes that much of the IRS’s involvement in health care 
regulation appears not only defensible, but efficient.  For better or for worse, there is no 
better system for processing payments to or from a large number of taxpayers than the 
federal income tax system.  Additionally, the use of excise taxes to shape taxpayer behavior 
appears to offer the best of both worlds: a powerful incentive that requires very few 
enforcement resources.  The article concludes, however, that significant burden could be 
removed from the IRS by modifying or removing the IRS’s substantive rulemaking authority 
with respect to health care matters, deferring instead to other federal agencies, such as the 
Department of Health and Human Services, that have particular health policy expertise.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is no doubt that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) is overburdened and 
stretched thin, failing to provide even basic levels of responsiveness to taxpayers.1  Yet 
despite a low level of resources, Congress continues to add to the IRS’s responsibilities in 
areas that appear far removed from the agency’s core revenue raising mission.  A prominent 
example of this is the deep involvement of the IRS in implementing the Affordable Care 
Act (“ACA”). 
While the IRS’s involvement in ACA implementation and administration has 
drawn attention to the fact that the IRS is one of the primary regulators of employer-
provided health care, this involvement is nothing new.  It was, after all, favorable tax 
treatment of employer-provided health care that led to the employer-centric system we 
have today.  The ACA, however, greatly expands the administrative burden on the IRS in 
this realm, to the extent that Professor Hickman in this issue questions whether health care 
regulation is something in which the IRS should have any role.  Nina Olson, the National 
Taxpayer Advocate, labeled ACA administration one of the “most serious problems 
encountered by taxpayers” in 2014.2  Even the Chief Justice appears skeptical of the role 
of the IRS in ACA administration, stating in King v. Burwell that the IRS “has no expertise 
in crafting health insurance policy.”3 
This article wades into the debate concerning the proper scope of IRS 
administration in a time of restricted resources and deep unpopularity for the IRS.  The 
article begins in Part II with a historical overview of how the IRS became a chief regulator 
of employer-provided benefits.  Part III examines how the passage of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) created a joint authority model for 
federal regulation of employee benefits, with the IRS and the Department of Labor sharing 
jurisdiction.  The development of the IRS as a substantive regulator of employer-provided 
health plans is explored in Part IV, noting the distinction between the IRS as a rulemaker 
versus the IRS as an enforcer of those substantive rules.  The article concludes in Part V 
by detailing how the ACA expands the IRS’s authority and administrative burden in health 
plan regulation, concluding that, while there are sound reasons to continue to use the tax 
code to achieve health policy goals, there are also steps that can be taken to reduce the 
associated administrative burdens. 
II. HOW TREASURY INITIALLY GOT INTO THE EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
BUSINESS 
For as long as there has been an Internal Revenue Code, there have been tax 
provisions addressing the taxation of employer-provided benefits.4  Initially, however, 
these provisions were limited to the taxability of pension trusts, and simply provided that 
amounts set aside in pension, profit sharing, or stock bonus plans would not be taxed until 
distribution, provided such plans were for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to 
plan participants, and benefits could only be distributed in accordance with the terms of 
                                                      
1 See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS vii (2014) (noting, 
among other things, “a devastating erosion of taxpayer service”). 
2 Id. at 67. 
3 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). 
4 See I.R.C. of 1939 § 165 (providing tax benefits to employer-sponsored retirement plans).  
Section 165 in the 1939 Code was the predecessor to § 401(a) in the current Code. 
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the plan.  There were broadly stated nondiscrimination requirements,5 but nothing like the 
complex mathematical requirements that apply today.  In addition, the Code provided that 
employers could deduct contributions made to such trusts.6  The Code was originally silent 
regarding any health or welfare benefits offered by employers.  As of the 1939 Code, then, 
the employee benefits provisions could be characterized as “pure tax” provisions.  The 
Code was simply codifying deferred compensation theory in delaying taxation until 
payment of benefits, while maintaining the employer’s compensation deduction when 
retirement plan contributions were made, rather than requiring such deduction to be 
delayed until benefit payout.  Other than a slight tax incentive to offer such plans, and a 
generally stated requirement that the plan be nondiscriminatory, there was no significant 
social engineering of employee benefits through the Code, and very little required in the 
way of tax administration.7 
The 1954 Code marked the first appearance of tax provisions related to employer-
provided health care.  Sections 105 and 106 were added to the Code, excluding from gross 
income payments from employer-provided health plans that reimbursed medical expenses, 
as well as employer contributions to such plans.8  These Code provisions codified a World 
War II era revenue ruling that amounts paid by employers for employee health insurance 
did not constitute income to employees,9 which was subsequently reversed in 1953.10  
Congress disagreed with this result, permanently adding the exclusion to the Code in 1954.  
This first appearance of health plan-related provisions could also be characterized as “pure 
tax.”  It simply excluded two types of economic benefit from the definition of gross income 
and did not otherwise impose any substantive requirements on employer plans.  Nor did it 
attempt to engage in any significant social engineering, other than an incentive for 
employers to offer health benefits, however structured.  As with early pension provisions, 
these health plan provisions imposed nearly no administrative burden on the IRS. 
III. THE PASSAGE OF ERISA AND THE INTRODUCTION OF JOINT 
AUTHORITY FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
The passage of ERISA dramatically expanded the role of Treasury in regulating 
employee benefit plans.  As described at the time of passage, “[ERISA] adopts the most 
sweeping overhaul of pension and employee benefit rules in history.  These new rules, 
which are both tax and non-tax in scope, will affect virtually every pension or other 
employee benefit plan, whether existent or future.”11  Rather than simply contain rules 
related to the taxation of retirement plans, ERISA amended the Code to include substantive 
participation, vesting, and funding requirements for retirement plans, and placed dollar 
                                                      
5 The nondiscrimination requirements prohibited discrimination in favor of highly-compensated 
employees.  Such provisions were not in the 1939 Code as originally enacted, but were added as amendments 
on Oct 21, 1942 by Session Law 56 Stat 798 (77th Congress, 2nd Session, Ch. 619). 
6 I.R.C. of 1939 § 23(p) (2015). 
7 The greatest administrative burden imposed by the employee benefits tax provisions would likely 
have been enforcing the nondiscrimination requirements.  However, employers had a duty to self-report their 
compliance with such provisions, leaving the IRS only with the discretionary task of verifying such reports.  
See Internal Revenue Service, Form 4848 (1973), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f4848--1973.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/85CQ-WPXX] (illustrating the minimal reporting requirements related to pension plan 
nondiscrimination rules). 
8See I.R.C. of 1954 §§ 105, 106 (2015). 
9 David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 25 (2001). 
10 Id. 
11 COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., PENSION REFORM ACT OF 1974 WITH EXPLANATION, Preface 
(1974). 
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amount limits on contributions and deductions.12  The Code was also amended to include 
an excise tax on certain violations of fiduciary duties.13  In addition to these tax changes, 
ERISA contained extensive reporting and disclosure requirements, fiduciary requirements, 
and remedial provisions that were not included in the Code amendments.14  ERISA was 
squarely aimed at pension plans and, while employer health plans were subject to ERISA 
and had to comply with its general requirements, ERISA did not in any way substantively 
regulate employer-provided health plans.  As a result, no health plan provisions were added 
to the Code as part of ERISA’s passage. 
ERISA did, however, put in place the current regulatory system for employee 
benefits, which involves joint rulemaking and enforcement authority shared by the IRS and 
Labor.15  The statutory text of ERISA provided for joint administration by Treasury and 
Labor, 16  but also assigned areas of “primary” responsibility.17   In the early years of 
implementation, this did not go well.  As President Carter declared, “ERISA has been a 
symbol of unnecessarily complex government regulation.” 18   ERISA’s administrative 
provisions “have resulted in bureaucratic confusion and have been justifiably criticized by 
employers and unions alike.  The biggest problem has been overlapping jurisdictional 
authority.”19  In Reorganization Plan No. 4, President Carter gave Treasury sole authority 
for enforcing minimum participation, vesting, and funding standards for retirement plans, 
while granting Labor authority to enforce fiduciary obligations.20  Treasury, however, 
continued to have authority to audit plans and levy tax penalties, while Labor continued to 
have authority to bring civil suits, thereby retaining “the special expertise of each 
Department.”21 
Given the difficulties that resulted from joint authority, it is interesting to review 
why such an unusual structure was adopted in the first place.  What motivated Congress to 
explicitly create joint authority for two agencies over the administration of a single statute?  
The answer, it appears, lies not in any special theory of agency administration, but rather 
in turf wars between Congressional committees.  As explained by one participant in 
ERISA’s legislative journey, “there is almost nothing more sacred in Congress than 
committee jurisdiction.  If one committee encroaches on the jurisdiction of another, there 
is bound to be a great deal of pushback, sometimes very severe pushback.  This is what 
happened in spades with ERISA.  Much of the story of ERISA's passage necessarily 
becomes the story of the clash between the Tax and Labor Committees and how that was 
resolved.”22  Joint Treasury and Labor authority was necessary in order to secure passage 
                                                      
12 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(3); 404(a)(3)(A); 415(a), (b) (2015). 
13 See I.R.C. §§ 4975(a), 4975(c)(1)(E) (2015). 
14 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2015). 
15 ERISA created the office of Assistant Commissioner, Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations 
within the Internal Revenue Service.  See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., supra note 11, at 904. 
16 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, § 3004. 
17 For example, primary administrative responsibility for participation, vesting, and funding 
provisions was assigned to the IRS.  COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., supra note 11, at 901.  The IRS was 
also granted authority to audit qualified plans.  Id. at 902. 




22 Panel 2: Making Sausage – The Ninety-Third Congress and ERISA, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 291, 300 
(2014). 
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of ERISA because neither committee nor agency was willing to give up jurisdiction over 
pensions.  Joint administration was the result of “interagency jealousy.”23 
Following passage of ERISA, some saw joint administration as a positive, based 
on the belief that the Department of Labor should not be left to enforce ERISA given its 
closeness with organized labor.24  In other words, there was a belief that Treasury would 
be a more neutral enforcer than Labor.  However, this was considered to be a positive side 
effect of the joint administrative structure, not a motivation for the structure’s creation. 
While the reasons behind the creation of the joint administrative structure of 
ERISA are not noble, scholars have put forth a variety of arguments concerning the benefits 
of this increasingly common regulatory structure.  Professors Freeman and Rossi have 
declared interagency coordination as “one of the central challenges of modern 
governance.” 25   One straightforward defense of multiple-agency jurisdiction is that 
complex policy problems can benefit from the “unique expertise and competencies of 
different agencies.”26  When we consider the IRS and Labor, this argument has some 
appeal.  While Labor may be well-suited to tasks that touch on the interactions between 
employers and employees, the IRS may be better suited for highly technical tasks.  Another 
argument put forward is that shared jurisdiction acts as a check on agency behavior, by 
reducing the risk of a single agency being captured by regulated parties.27 
IV. PRE-ACA SUBSTANTIVE HEALTH PLAN REGULATION THROUGH 
EXCISE TAXES 
While ERISA brought the IRS firmly into the business of employee benefits, that 
work was almost exclusively concerned with traditional, defined-benefit pension plans.  
The only Code provisions concerned with health plans were the uncomplicated sections 
105 and 106.28  This relatively simple approach to the taxation of employer-sponsored 
health plans began to change in the 1980s, when substantive requirements for group health 
plans were first included in the Code. 
Prior to the enactment of the ACA, there were three major health plan-related 
additions to the Code that meaningfully expanded the IRS’s role in health regulation.29  The 
first of these substantive requirements was passed as part of the Consolidated Omnibus 
                                                      
23 Id. at 304. 
24 Panel 3: Negotiating the Agency Peace Treaty: Reorganization Plan No. 4, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 
319, 324 (2014). 
25 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1131, 1134 (2012). 
26 Id. at 1142. 
27 Id. at 1142-43. 
28 Section 105 did become slightly more complicated when paragraph (h) was added as part of 
1978 Revenue Act, Pub. L. 95-600 § 366, which taxes discriminatory health benefits provided to highly-
compensated employees. 
29 I omit from this article any discussion of section 89 of the Code, which was added to the Code as 
part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act.  Section 89 imposed non-discrimination requirements on employer 
provided health plans, similar to the requirements imposed on retirement plans, and for similar reasons.  For 
plans that were considered discriminatory under section 89, highly-compensated employees covered by such 
plans had to include in gross income the amount of the discriminatory benefit.  Given the significant cost of 
the tax expenditure for employer-provided health plans, Congress was attempting to ensure that the tax 
benefit was not concentrated among highly-compensated individuals.  Section 89, however, was not long-
lived.  It was repealed in 1989 following significant backlash against its complexity and administrative 
impracticability.  For further information on section 89’s history, see Rosina B. Barker, Lessons from a 
Legislative Disaster, 47 TAX NOTES 843 (1990), http://www.ipbtax.com/assets/pdf/publication_129.pdf. 
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Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).30  COBRA gave participants the right to 
continue their employer-provided group coverage for a limited period of time if such 
coverage was terminated as a result of a “qualifying event.”31  These provisions were 
codified in the Code, ERISA,32 and the Public Health Services Act (“PHSA”).33  COBRA, 
then, followed the basic structure established by ERISA in that both Treasury and Labor 
remained involved in the regulation of employee benefits.  The Department of Health & 
Human Services (“HHS”) was added to the legislative scheme in order to bring state and 
local government plans within COBRA’s reach, as ERISA does not apply to such plans.  
While three agencies were involved in administering virtually identical statutory 
provisions, COBRA was silent as to how this joint administration was to operate in 
practice.  As a result, the agencies relied on a conference committee report, which stated 
that rulemaking authority would be split, with Labor authorized to issue regulations 
implementing the notice and disclosure requirements of COBRA, and the IRS authorized 
to issue regulations defining the required continuation coverage.34  HHS was not granted 
independent authority to interpret COBRA, instead being ordered to conform its 
implementing regulations to those promulgated by Labor and Treasury.35  COBRA does, 
however, contain separate enforcement provisions.  On the tax side, the Code originally 
denied a deduction to employers for their group health plan contributions if they failed to 
comply with COBRA.36  Shortly after passage, however, the penalty for noncompliance 
with COBRA’s requirements was changed to an excise tax payable by the employer of 
$100 per day per affected individual.37  On the ERISA side, Labor has the ability to enforce 
COBRA by bringing a civil suit against a non-complying employer, which may include a 
penalty of up to $100 per day for each affected beneficiary or participant.38  Affected 
individuals may also bring civil suit under ERISA and seek the same remedies.39  Finally, 
individuals in state and local government plans are authorized to file civil suits for COBRA 
noncompliance under the PHSA.40 
The second major addition to the Code’s regulation of employer-provided health 
plans was the Medicare as Secondary Payer (MSP) rules.41  These rules regulate whether 
an employer plan or Medicare pays first in the case of individuals covered by both, a rule 
that has significant financial consequences for both the Medicare program and employer 
plans.  The rules generally provide for the employer plan to pay first, thereby saving the 
Medicare program money.  These substantive provisions were codified in the Social 
Security Act,42 while the Code was amended to provide for an excise tax on non-complying 
employers equal to 25% of a non-complying employer’s group health plan expenses in the 
                                                      
30 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 
82 (1986). 
31 I.R.C. § 4980B (2015). 
32 COBRA, Pub. L. 99-272 § 10002. 
33 Id. § 10003. 
34 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 562-63 (1985). 
35 Id. at 563. 
36 COBRA § 10001(a). 
37 I.R.C. § 4980B(b) (2015).  
38 ERISA § 502(a) (authorizing civil suits by participants or the Department of Labor) and 
§502(c)(1) (authorizing courts to award up to $100 per individual per day, along with other relief the court 
deems proper). 
39 ERISA § 502(a). 
40 COBRA § 10003 (adding § 2207 to the PHSA). 
41 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-509 § 9319. 
42 Id. § 9319(a). 
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relevant year.43  Unlike COBRA, which involved shared rulemaking and enforcement 
authority among three agencies, the MSP rules followed a simpler model.  Because the 
MSP rules are primarily a cost-saving device for Medicare, the Department of Health & 
Human Services, specifically the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), is 
responsible for rulemaking and primary enforcement, with CMS informing the IRS when 
the excise tax may be due.44  This structure can be characterized as “split authority,” rather 
than the overlapping jurisdiction model we see in other areas of employee benefit 
regulation. 
The third and final regulation of health plans through the Code came with the 
passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”).45  
HIPAA was a significant piece of legislation that regulated many aspects of health plans 
and health insurers.  From an employer health plan perspective, the major changes made 
by HIPAA were: (1) limiting the ability of employers to exclude pre-existing conditions 
from their plans, (2) prohibiting employer plans from discriminating on the basis of health 
status with respect to eligibility, premiums, and benefits, (3) requiring plans to cover 
minimum hospital stays following childbirth, and (4) requiring plans that covered mental 
health treatment and services to do so on parity with other medical services.46  As with 
COBRA, HIPAA was codified in three different statutes: the Code, ERISA, and the 
PHSA.47  Unlike COBRA, however, HIPAA contained an explicit statutory provision 
requiring the three agencies to cooperate in rulemaking and enforcement: 
SEC. 104. ASSURING COORDINATION. 
The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, and the Secretary of Labor shall ensure, through the execution 
of an interagency memorandum of understanding among such Secretaries, 
that— 
(1) regulations, rulings, and interpretations issued by such Secretaries 
relating to the same matter over which two or more such Secretaries have 
responsibility under this subtitle (and the amendments made by this 
subtitle and section 401) are administered so as to have the same effect at 
all times; and 
                                                      
43 Id. § 9319(d)(1) (adding § 5000 to the I.R.C.). 
44 As the CMS enforcement manual explains: 
 If CMS Central Office determines that a plan has been a nonconforming [group 
health plan] in a particular year, it refers its determination, including the identity of the 
contributors that it has identified, to the IRS, but only after the parties have exhausted all 
appeal rights with respect to the determination.  Section 5000 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 imposes an excise tax penalty on employers and employee organizations that 
contribute to nonconforming GHPs.  They are taxed 25 percent of the employer's or 
employee organization's expenses incurred during the calendar year for each [group health 
plan] (conforming as well as nonconforming) to which they contribute.  This tax penalty 
does not apply to Federal and other governmental employers.  The IRS administers Section 
5000 of the IRC, which imposes the tax on employers (other than governmental entities) 
or employee organizations that contribute to a nonconforming [group health plan] 
mentioned in § 80. 
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER (MSP) MANUAL 36 (2014), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/msp105c01.pdf. 
45 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
46 Id. § 101 (adding §§ 701 et seq. to ERISA). 
47 See generally HIPAA, Pub. L. 104-191 (1996). 
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(2) coordination of policies relating to enforcing the same requirements 
through such Secretaries in order to have a coordinated enforcement 
strategy that avoids duplication of enforcement efforts and assigns 
priorities in enforcement.48 
The relevant departments entered into the required memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) in 1999, three years after the passage of HIPAA.49  The process described in the 
MOU is one of ongoing collaboration.  Each department assigns a representative to “work 
closely to ensure that all Interpretations, Regulations and enforcement strategies related to 
shared provisions [of HIPAA] will be developed and implemented in a coordinated 
manner.”50  This “Coordinating Committee” is required to meet quarterly (or at other times 
as they mutually agree) to discuss pending interpretative guidance.51  The MOU sets a 45-
day period to attempt to reach consensus, although it does not spell out what happens in 
the event that such consensus is not achieved.52  While there is little publicly available 
information regarding how the joint rulemaking structure has operated in practice, 
rulemaking under HIPAA has historically been slow, with officials attributing delays to 
both the complexity of the statute as well as “the protracted nature of developing policy 
and rules when multiple federal agencies are involved and the complexity of the statutory 
provisions.”53 
While both the statute and the MOU require some degree of coordination with 
respect to enforcement, it is important to note that different enforcement tools are available 
to the various agencies.  As with COBRA, the IRS’s sole enforcement tool is the imposition 
of an excise tax of $100 per day per affected individual during the period of 
noncompliance.54  Affected individuals may bring civil lawsuits under ERISA to enforce 
HIPAA,55 although there is no monetary fine prescribed by the statute.  The Department of 
Labor is not granted authority to commence civil action against a HIPAA non-complying 
employer; only individuals may commence such actions.56  HHS, which has authority over 
health insurers and nonfederal governmental plans with respect to HIPAA, may impose a 
civil monetary penalty on non-complying health insurers.57  HIPAA specifically requires 
Treasury, Labor and HHS to coordinate enforcement activities, and the MOU discussed 
above lays out the basic framework for such coordination in a highly generalized manner.  
The MOU provides that the departments will coordinate, share information, and develop a 
“written operational agreement” that can address various enumerated enforcement topics.58  
The only specific requirement in the MOU with respect to enforcement is that the 
Departments are required to notify each other in writing prior to commencing any 
                                                      
48 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-92 note (2015). 
49 Notice of Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding among the Department of the Treasury, 
the Department of Labor, and the Department of Health and Human Services, 64 Fed. Reg. 70164 (Dec. 15, 
1999) [hereinafter “HIPAA MOU”]. 
50 Id. at 70165. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF HIPAA: PROGRESS SLOW IN ENFORCING 
FEDERAL STANDARDS IN NONCONFORMING STATES 15-16 (2000). 
54 I.R.C. § 4980D(b) (2012). 
55 ERISA § 502(a)(1).  
56 Id.; HIPAA MOU, supra note 49, at 70165. 
57 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22 (2012). 
58 HIPAA MOU, supra note 49, at 70166. 
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administrative or judicial proceeding on HIPAA matters within the shared regulatory 
space.59 
A. The IRS as Health Plan Rulemaker 
The three pieces of legislation described above were significant additions to the 
IRS’s role in employer health plan regulation, involving both rulemaking tasks and 
enforcement tasks.  With respect to rulemaking, however, Congress initially appeared 
interested in shielding the IRS from significant substantive involvement.  The IRS was 
given just a single piece of COBRA rulemaking: the task of defining the required 
continuation coverage.  While the IRS COBRA regulations are extensive, they do not force 
the IRS to stray too far from typical tax administration.  For example, the regulations 
involve topics such as how corporate transactions affect COBRA rights,60 how to count 
employees,61 how to identify the “employer”62 and how to calculate plan costs,63 all topics 
that are comfortably within the expertise of the IRS.  Yet IRS responsibility for COBRA 
did begin to push the IRS into the health policy arena.  For example, the IRS defined in 
regulations the meaning of “health care” and issued regulations outlining the interaction 
between COBRA and participant rights under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act.64  
The IRS was completely shielded from any responsibility for MSP rulemaking (leaving 
them only to collect penalties for noncompliance).  With HIPAA, the IRS was given a 
greatly expanded role in substantive health plan rulemaking (on paper, at least).  The IRS 
was given an equal role at the table with Labor and HHS when it came to any rulemaking 
that involved employer-provided coverage, and jointly promulgated regulations that had a 
significant health policy impact.65  In this way, HIPAA looks like a tipping point at which 
the IRS really became a health policy agency.  What is unclear, however, is what exactly 
the role of the IRS was in developing these health policy regulations: which agency, if any, 
took the lead in formulating the regulations, what the actual administrative burden was on 
the IRS, and what internal expertise, if any, the IRS subsequently developed in the health 
policy arena. 
B. The IRS as Health Plan Enforcer 
The sole method for the IRS to enforce the health plan provisions contained in the 
Code is through the imposition of an excise tax.  An excise tax can be imposed through 
one of two methods: (1) self-reporting by the tax payer, or (2) direct assessment by the IRS, 
typically accomplished through audit or third-party reporting. 
The IRS’s enforcement of COBRA’s requirements has been historically almost 
non-existent.66  Until 2010, employers did not even have a duty to self-report COBRA 
violations and pay the excise tax.67  Even worse, the dual enforcement structure shared 
between the IRS and Labor appears to confuse individuals about where they should go for 
help.  A 1990 GAO report found that thousands of individuals contacted the IRS about 
                                                      
59 Id. 
60 Treas. Reg. § 54.4980B-9 (2012). 
61 Treas. Reg. § 54.4980B-2 (2012). 
62 Id. 
63 Treas. Reg. § 54.4980B-8 (2012). 
64 Treas. Reg. § 54.4980B-10 (2012). 
65 Treas. Reg. §§ 54.9801-1 to 54.9801-3, 54.9811-1 (2012); I.R.C. § 9812 (2012). 
66 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN ENFORCING HEALTH INSURANCE 
CONTINUATION REQUIREMENTS 5 (1990) (noting one completed examination of a potential COBRA 
violation). 
67 74 Fed. Reg. 45,994 (Sept. 8, 2009). 
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COBRA rights and violations but, because the Code does not provide individuals with a 
right of action, such individuals were simply referred to Labor.  While it is unknown how 
many of those individuals subsequently followed up with Labor, IRS very rarely examined 
the employers of individuals who made inquiries.68  There is no publicly available data 
regarding how many employers have self-reported the excise tax, how many employers 
have been sanctioned on audit, nor how much revenue the excise tax has raised. 
With respect to HIPAA compliance, the IRS takes an explicitly passive role, 
relying solely on “voluntary employer compliance” and referrals from the Department of 
Labor.69  Until 2010, however, there was no obligation for noncomplying employers to 
self-report the excise tax.70  As of 2001, Treasury officials told the GAO that “they did not 
believe the agency has assessed, nor has any employer voluntarily paid, an excise tax 
associated with noncompliance.”71 
MSP excise tax compliance appears better organized.  While there is no 
requirement for noncomplying taxpayers to self-report the MSP excise tax, CMS has a 
robust enforcement regime in place, and it has a procedure in place for referring employers 
that fail to satisfy CMS’s MSP demands for compliance within a specific timeframe to 
Treasury for imposition of the excise tax.72  There is no publicly available information 
regarding the number or such referrals, or the frequency or amount of any excise tax paid 
as a result.  The health plan-related excise taxes, then, do not appear to place a significant 
administrative burden on the IRS. 
C. Making Sense of the Excise Tax Model 
The story thus far presents a rather nonsensical role for the IRS in the substantive 
regulation of group health plans.  The IRS has been given what should be a very powerful 
enforcement mechanism, yet available data suggest that it is not used.  While this is positive 
from an IRS resource perspective, it raises legitimate questions regarding whether these 
provisions should be in the Code in the first place.  As this section will describe, however, 
the excise tax might not need to be enforced in order to achieve its goals. 
1. Why Litigation is an Insufficient Compliance Mechanism 
Before the passage of the ACA, each of the health plan provisions that was added 
to the Code was also contained elsewhere in federal law and had litigation-based remedies 
available to harmed individuals under those provisions.  Why, then, might Congress desire 
to add the additional layer of enforcement through an excise tax?  The answer lies in the 
fact that excise taxes (at least in the health plan context) are not designed to raise revenue.  
                                                      
68 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 5. 
69 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: FEDERAL ROLE IN ENFORCING 
NEW STANDARDS CONTINUES TO EVOLVE 11 (2001) [hereinafter “HIPAA GAO report”].  In practice, HHS 
appeared to be overburdened by its HIPAA enforcement activities, and therefore struggled to effectively 
enforce HIPAA’s requirements.  Labor, at least in the early years, relied largely on consumer complaints to 
identify noncompliance.  A random sample of employer HIPAA compliance by Labor, conducted in 1999, 
revealed a 21% noncompliance rate for certain HIPAA standards—although the DOL characterized many of 
the violations as “technical” in nature.  Where DOL discovered violations, it worked with the employer to 
voluntarily correct the default and had not (as of 2001) initiated any legal action to force compliance.  Id. at 
10-11. 
70 74 Fed. Reg. 45,994 (Sept. 8, 2009). 
71 HIPAA GAO report, supra note 69, at 11. 
72See Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Group Health Plan Recovery, https://www.cms.gov 
/Medicare/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery-Overview 
/Group-Health-Plan-Recovery/Group-Health-Plan-Recovery.html, for an overview of the CMS enforcement 
process and referrals to Treasury. 
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They are designed to strongly encourage ex ante compliance.  For the reasons explained 
below, litigation does not have the same compliance effect. 
Participants who are harmed by a lack of health plan compliance may seek redress 
in state or federal court.73  Because such lawsuits are brought under ERISA, remedies 
would typically be limited to requiring the plan to cover the required service or otherwise 
comply with the legal requirements and to potentially pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, 
along with interest if applicable.  Punitive damages are not available to ERISA litigants.74  
It is likely that there will be relatively few participant lawsuits seeking to enforce group 
health plan requirements because of the limited remedies, barriers caused by a lack of 
knowledge of highly complex legal requirements, lack of easy access to legal services, and 
a disinclination to sue one’s employer. 
In addition to participant lawsuits, however, the Department of Labor has 
investigative authority that enables it to work with employers to voluntarily remedy any 
compliance defects that it discovers.75  The Department of Labor may also commence a 
civil action against a non-complying employer, although the remedies available are highly 
limited.76  As a result, the threat of Department of Labor action, either on audit or through 
civil lawsuits, is similarly unlikely to create a significant compliance incentive. 
The bottom line is that while litigation may serve an important remedial function 
for harmed participants, it is likely to have little ex ante compliance effect.  Lawsuits and 
Department of Labor action are neither frequent nor costly enough to be effective in making 
the cost-benefit analysis favor compliance over noncompliance.77 
2. The Excise Tax as Compliance Mechanism 
While we normally rely on the cost-benefit analysis associated with potential 
litigation to create the optimal level of legal compliance, 78  ERISA’s highly limited 
remedial provisions prevent this from occurring in the employer health plan context.  
Excise taxes, however, have the potential to significantly change the cost-benefit analysis 
to one that strongly favors compliance. 
Excise taxes occupy an unusual role in the federal tax system.  They are not 
typically based on any theory of ideal taxation, nor do they have as their primary goal the 
raising of revenue.  Rather, they are almost always devised to discourage behavior that 
Congress deems to be undesirable.79  Excise taxes, it should be noted, provide a specific 
type of deterrence that is otherwise hard to achieve within the tax system.  The most 
common method that is used in the Code to discourage certain behavior is to deny a 
                                                      
73 ERISA § 502. 
74 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
75 ERISA § 502. 
76 Id. 
77 This is not to suggest that employers are relying solely on a cost-benefit analysis when deciding 
whether to comply with the law.  Many other forces are clearly at play.  See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good 
Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). 
78 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 887-96 (1998). 
79 For example, the IRS has explicitly stated that COBRA excise tax is “designed as a deterrent 
against noncompliance.”  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., AUDIT TECHNIQUES AND TAX LAW TO EXAMINE COBRA 
CASES (CONTINUATION OF EMPLOYEE HEALTH CARE COVERAGE), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-
Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Audit-Techniques-and-Tax-Law-to-Examine-COBRA-Cases-Continuation-of-
Employee-Health-Care-Coverage. 
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deduction for an expense associated with the behavior.  For example, the Code denies a 
deduction for bribes and kickbacks paid by a business, even though they might otherwise 
be permitted under the general deduction for business expenses.80  In fact, when COBRA 
was first added to the Code, noncomplying businesses would lose their deduction for group 
health plan expenses, rather than face an excise tax.  But the loss of a deduction is imperfect 
in its compliance effect because the value of a lost deduction can vary significantly with 
the employer’s effective tax rate.81  A lost deduction might be a strong deterrent for some 
taxpayers, yet have no effect on taxpayers who have little to no tax liability.  In addition, 
lost deductions are not highly visible to taxpayers, because they are simply folded into the 
general income tax calculation.  An excise tax solves both of these problems by applying 
uniformly across taxpayers and with high visibility.  As a result, excise taxes should factor 
into the cost-benefit analysis of all taxpayers, thereby improving front-end compliance. 
Excise taxes are in fact a form of “announced” penalty for certain behaviors.82  
They are very similar to statutorily specified damages, but instead of being enforced 
through the courts, they are enforced by the IRS.  Because excise taxes are due regardless 
of participant harm or participant legal action, they can be thought of as a type of 
precommitment device with respect to compliance.83  Indeed, if the excise tax is set high 
enough, it should function to deter nearly all violations of a legal rule.84  Its effect can be 
to “front-load” compliance so that further remedies are unnecessary.85  As Professor Bray 
summarizes this compliance function of high, announced penalties, “[t]he law is 
announcing in terrorem.”86 
While there is a strong case to favor the use of high, fixed penalties in order to 
achieve compliance, it is not obvious that the best or only way to do so is through excise 
taxes.  For example, COBRA gives the Department of Labor the ability to file suit in the 
event of noncompliance and seek a monetary penalty of up to $100 per day.  However, this 
provision is unlikely to have the same effect as an excise tax because it both requires 
litigation and it is discretionary in amount, in contrast to an excise tax.  Theoretically, 
however, Congress could remedy both of these defects and give the Department of Labor 
the authority to impose a civil monetary fine equal to the excise tax through administrative 
procedures.  Interestingly, Congress appears to have favored IRS enforcement in this area 
because the IRS is viewed as much more fearsome than Labor, particularly given Labor’s 
close historic ties to organized labor.87  So while other agencies could be given the ability 
to impose high, fixed penalties for noncompliance, the compliance effect might not be as 
great as the imposition of these penalties by the IRS. 
3. The Excise Tax in Practice 
                                                      
80 I.R.C. § 162(c) (2012). 
81 See John D. Colombo, Paying for Sins of the Master: An Analysis of the Tax Effects of Pension 
Plan Disqualification and a Proposal for Reform, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 84 (1992) (referring to excise taxes as 
the “obvious choice for a targeted deterrent sanction”).  See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
COMMISSIONER’S PENALTY STUDY, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES IX-16 (1989) (noting that excise taxes 
“generally have been effective” as deterrents). 
82 See generally Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753 (2012) 
(discussing the term in the context of civil remedies). 
83 Id. at 781. 
84 Id. at 784-85. 
85 Id. at 785. 
86 Id. 
87 Panel 3: Negotiating the Agency Peace Treaty: Reorganization Plan No. 4, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 
319, 324, 335 (2014). 
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On a theoretical level, then, there is much to support the excise tax model as a 
compliance mechanism.  Given current IRS funding levels and resources, however, it is 
not clear that the excise tax will actually achieve its goals.  If it becomes apparent to 
employers that the threat of excise tax enforcement is empty, it may have little effect.  But 
this is speculation; the mere threat of outsized excise tax penalties may be enough to force 
compliance, even if regulated parties believe the probability of being caught is low. 
It seems reasonable to believe that the success of excise taxes in ensuring front-
end compliance will depend both on actual enforcement and on perceptions of enforcement 
by regulated parties.  Publicly available information, however, suggests that there is very 
little enforcement of the excise tax provisions.  Until 2010, there was not even an 
affirmative obligation for taxpayers to self-report either the COBRA- or HIPAA-related 
excise taxes, decades after the statutes became law,88 and available information suggests 
that the IRS does little to no independent enforcement of these provisions. 
The good news from an IRS resource perspective is that these excise taxes appear 
to require little to no effort with respect to enforcement (in contrast to rulemaking), but that 
raises the question of whether unenforced excise taxes have the compliance effect theorized 
above.  Usually, tax compliance is concerned with whether taxpayers voluntarily report 
their tax due accurately.  Compliance is different in the case of the excise taxes.  The 
compliance we are concerned with is not what is reported on a tax return (indeed, as noted 
above, there were no requirements to self-report any of the health plan-related excise taxes 
until 2010), but rather whether the excise taxes result in employers complying with the 
underlying health plan regulations.  Nevertheless, there is likely still something to be 
learned from the tax compliance literature.  There are two general theories regarding tax 
compliance: (1) taxpayers comply with tax laws because they engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis of compliance versus noncompliance, and find compliance to be the least costly, 
and (2) taxpayers comply with tax laws in order to conform to personal or social norms.89 
Applying these compliance theories to excise taxes, we can guess that both 
contribute to compliance with the substantive health plan rules.  With respect to the cost-
benefit theory of tax compliance, a large penalty, even if rarely enforced, is likely to have 
the same deterrence effect as a smaller penalty more consistently enforced.  And the excise 
taxes at issue here are large indeed.  Recall that most are $100 per day per participant.  In 
general, it would be highly unlikely that noncompliance would occur for only a short period 
of time, as the structure of health plans does not frequently change (typically no more than 
once per year).  An employer with 50 employees, who failed to comply with a group health 
plan requirement for a single year, would face a potential excise tax of $1.825 million.  A 
large, national retailer with 125,000 employees would face a potential excise tax of $3.65 
billion.  Even if the perceived probability of enforcement is incredibly low, it is not hard 
to imagine that the cost-benefit analysis for employers of all sizes favors compliance. 
On top of the cost-benefit analysis, it also appears to be the case that many 
taxpayers will comply with the law out of adherence to social norms.  As a result, while 
we have no hard data on this issue, it appears likely that the excise tax strongly encourages 
front-end compliance even with very low levels of enforcement.  From both an IRS 
                                                      
88 74 Fed. Reg. 45994 (promulgating Treas. Reg. § 54.6011-2). 
89 See Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 124-38 
(2009); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 
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resources and compliance perspective, then, the excise taxes appear to be a worthwhile 
addition to the Code. 
D. The Pre-ACA Position 
Prior to the ACA’s enactment, the IRS was already firmly entrenched in the 
business of employer health plan regulation.  While the reasons behind that involvement 
may have been less than compelling, the use of the excise tax as a compliance mechanism 
appears sound.  Excise taxes should greatly improve front-end compliance with rules that 
might otherwise be too easy to ignore, and, even better given current IRS resources, can 
achieve their goals with relatively little investment by the government.  The IRS’s 
substantive health plan rulemaking is more troubling, but closer examination reveals that 
such rulemaking often involves tasks comfortably within the IRS’s expertise, and that 
shared rulemaking authority may have placed little burden on the IRS if, as one would 
expect, agencies with greater substantive expertise took the lead in drafting such rules. 
V. THE ACA AND THE FUTURE OF THE IRS’S ROLE 
The ACA continues the pattern of the IRS’s involvement in the substantive 
regulation of employer-provided health plans.  Along with Labor and HHS, the IRS will 
be significantly involved in administering the ACA’s individual mandate, employer 
mandate, premium tax credit, excise tax on high-cost employer plans, and substantive 
group health plan requirements.  The role of the IRS in both rulemaking and enforcement 
around these ACA requirements is explored in more detail below. 
A. The IRS as Substantive Rulemaker under the ACA 
The scope of the ACA is vast, and the corresponding rulemaking required to 
implement the law is similarly staggering.90  One of the best known tax provisions in the 
ACA is the so-called individual mandate.  The individual mandate imposes a financial 
penalty on uninsured individuals who have affordable health insurance available to them.91  
Because this provision is contained exclusively in the Code, the IRS has primary 
rulemaking authority.  The rulemaking authority is not, however, exclusive.  HHS has the 
authority to determine which individuals qualify for hardship exceptions to the individual 
mandate,92 and HHS and Treasury are required to coordinate efforts to further define what 
“other coverage” might satisfy the individual mandate requirements.93 
A similar rulemaking structure is used with respect to the employer mandate 
penalty, which is also contained exclusively in the Code.94  While the IRS has primary 
rulemaking authority, Labor is relied on to define a “seasonal worker” for purposes of the 
penalty,95 and Labor and IRS together must define “hours of service” for purposes of 
determining who is a full-time employee for purposes of the penalty.96 
The premium tax credit falls almost entirely within the IRS’s authority, although 
the statute gives HHS the authority to determine which part of the premium, if any, is 
attributable to state-required benefits that are not permitted to be included for purposes of 
                                                      
90 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, Rulemaking Requirements and 
Authorities in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 1-2 (2011), http://perma.cc/XB5K-
TJJS, for an overview of the regulatory tasks involved in ACA implementation. 
91 I.R.C. § 5000A. 
92 I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(5). 
93 I.R.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(E). 
94 PPACA § 1513 (adding § 4980H to the I.R.C.). 
95 I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
96 I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(B). 
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the premium tax credit calculation.97  In addition, the statute instructs the IRS and HHS to 
cooperate regarding necessary regulations on family size and household income for 
purposes of the premium tax credits.98  The excise tax on high-cost employer plans, known 
colloquially as the “Cadillac Tax,” falls entirely within the IRS’s rulemaking authority.99 
The most significant rulemaking burden imposed on the IRS by the ACA may be 
the oft-overlooked section 9815.  Section 9815 incorporates into the Code all of the ACA’s 
group health plan requirements that were added to the PHSA.  These include at least twenty 
substantive requirements,100 and were also codified in section 715 of ERISA.  Plans that 
fail to comply with the group health plan requirements are subject to the $100 per 
participant per day excise tax in section 4980D.  This tri-statute amendment scheme mirrors 
HIPAA’s structure, and was presumably based on the same rationale.  Amending both the 
PHSA and ERISA is necessary to cover all group health plans, because ERISA does not 
apply to governmental or church plans, and amending the Code through the addition of an 
excise tax is an important tool to encourage front-end compliance. 
The result of codifying the requirements in three statutes is that all three agencies 
have a role in rulemaking.  While the ACA does not contain any specific requirement for 
coordinated rulemaking for the group health plan requirements, the MOU the Departments 
signed to coordinate HIPAA rulemaking and enforcement was also intended by the 
Departments to apply to any future federal legislation “concerning health care which result 
in two or more . . . Departments having shared jurisdiction.”101  The three agencies have in 
fact been following the MOU coordination provisions, effectively giving the three agencies 
an equal role in the regulatory process, given the requirement to reach a consensus.  
Imposing such a rulemaking burden on the IRS, however, is difficult to justify. 
The group health plan requirements are far removed from nearly any traditional 
tax issues or concerns,102 and may be well outside the competence of even those in the 
employee benefits division of the IRS.  The substantive group health plan requirements 
include detailed provisions regarding what treatments and services a plan must cover, how 
plans can impose cost-sharing for those services, and how coverage can be priced, among 
many others.  Perhaps the most well-known of these provisions is the requirement that 
group health plans cover preventive health services.  Preventive health services were 
defined to include contraception, which some private employers objected to on religious 
grounds, resulting in the Hobby Lobby litigation.103  The IRS, as a result of the Hobby 
Lobby decision, helped draft a solution that both provided the required contraceptives to 
employees, but did not interfere with a closely-held private firm’s religious beliefs.  It is 
hard to imagine a task that is further removed from the core tasks of a revenue agency.  Of 
course, the overlapping jurisdiction model makes it difficult to determine exactly what role 
the IRS played in drafting these regulations. 
B. The IRS as ACA Enforcer 
                                                      
97 I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(D)(ii). 
98 I.R.C. § 36B(e)(3). 
99 See generally I.R.C. § 4980I. 
100 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001 (2010) (adding 
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Prior to the ACA, IRS enforcement of group health plan regulations was 
accomplished through imposition of an excise tax on non-compliant plans.  The ACA 
continues to build on this model, but it also moves IRS enforcement into new areas. 
Several of the major tax provisions in the ACA are non-excise taxes, including the 
individual mandate penalty and the employer mandate penalty.  In terms of enforcement, 
these non-excise taxes fit relatively easily into the existing structure of our tax system.  
They require individual taxpayers to self-report and pay any tax due as a result of failing 
to purchase affordable health insurance and require large employers to self-report and pay 
any tax due as a result of failing to offer employees affordable health insurance coverage.  
While tax forms need to be modified accordingly, these taxes look and feel like many others 
already in our system.  And in terms of how the IRS ensures compliance with these 
provisions, the standard auditing mechanism can easily be utilized, requiring few extra 
resources.  Individual mandate enforcement does, however, play by slightly different rules.  
The statute specifies that the individual mandate tax shall be treated as an “assessable 
penalty under subchapter B of chapter 68.”104  However, the Code specifies that the IRS 
may not utilize liens or levies where there has been a failure to pay the individual mandate 
tax due.105  The employer mandate follows the same “assessable penalty” treatment,106 
although there is no limitation of liens or levies in its provisions. 
The premium tax credits are not “enforced” in the way that we typically think of 
enforcement, and therefore do not result in typical enforcement costs.  Instead, it is more 
helpful to think of premium tax credits as requiring administration.  Here we see a 
significant burden being placed on IRS resources.  While the IRS is no stranger to 
administering tax credits, the structure of the premium tax credits is highly unique because 
the credit is advanceable.  Tax credits are normally administered through the standard tax 
return filing process.  When tax payers file their return for a given year, they will claim any 
applicable credits on their return and the amount of the tax they owe will be 
correspondingly reduced.  While this works well for many types of credits, there was 
concern that requiring taxpayers to wait until the end of the year (when they filed their tax 
returns) to receive the benefit of the premium tax credit would defeat the purpose of 
providing the cash flow necessary to pay for health insurance for that year.  Those who are 
eligible to receive premium tax credits do not often have the ability to pay the cost of health 
insurance upfront and then wait a year or more for reimbursement through the tax filing 
process.  As a result, the ACA allows individuals to receive an advance of the premium tax 
credit, using a best estimate of eligibility.107  Individuals who apply for coverage through 
an exchange are screened for tax credit eligibility. 108   The IRS shares data with the 
exchanges to verify income from the most recently available year.109  The exchange then 
informs the IRS of the estimated tax credit, and the IRS pays the relevant insurance 
companies directly on the individual’s behalf.110  When that individual files her tax return 
for the year, the premium tax credit will be reconciled based on the actual amount of that 
                                                      
104 I.R.C. § 5000A(g) (2010).  Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6671 (2012), assessable penalties are “assessed 
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individual’s household income, compared to the estimate on which the advanced credit was 
based.111  If additional credit amounts are due, those will be credited to the taxpayer and 
will either reduce the tax that is owed or be refunded.112  If the advanced credit was larger 
than the taxpayer was actually entitled to, the taxpayer may be required to repay the excess 
amount. 113   The administrative burden of estimating and reconciling tax credits is 
significant and has both confused and angered taxpayers.114  While it may make sense to 
administer widespread financial subsidies through the Code, the complex system of 
advancing and reconciling tax credits imposes a serious burden on the IRS, not only in 
terms of workload, but also with respect to the reputation of the IRS.115 
The Cadillac Tax is an excise tax, although it differs in key respects from the type 
of excise tax we typically see in the health plan context.  First, the amount of the excise tax 
is calculated in a different manner than the typical $100 per day per individual.  Instead, 
the tax is equal to 40% of the cost of employer-provided health care coverage above a 
certain dollar threshold that can vary based on an individual’s age, type of profession, or 
union status.116  As a result, it is much harder to determine easily, and in advance, how 
much would be due.  In addition, the tax is spread among all health plan providers, which 
may include multiple taxpayers, such as the employer, and one or more health insurers.117  
Perhaps the most important difference is that it is not designed to encourage compliance 
with substantive health plan regulations, but is instead aimed at encouraging employers to 
offer less generous health plans, with the intent of lowering overall health care 
expenditures.  In this sense, the Cadillac Tax is similar to the other health-related excise 
taxes in that its ultimate goal is to change behavior, not raise revenue.118  As a result, while 
the Cadillac Tax’s provisions are quite complicated, there may not be a significant 
administrative cost associated with them, since the strong incentive it provides to avoid the 
excise tax in the first place largely negates the need for IRS administration and 
enforcement. 
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Finally, the IRS has a potentially enormous compliance burden imposed by section 
9815, which incorporates all of the ACA’s substantive group health plan requirements into 
the Code.  Section 9815, together with section 4980D, subjects non-complying employers 
to the same $100 per participant per day excise tax as that imposed for HIPAA 
noncompliance.119  The MOU signed between Treasury, Labor, and HHS by its terms also 
applies to the ACA.120  All that the MOU requires in terms of enforcement, however, is 
coordination between the Departments.  It does not grant a single agency primary authority, 
or in any way limit enforcement.  What is not publicly known is how the agencies will 
handle enforcement in practice.  Recall that with HIPAA, Treasury does not independently 
enforce HIPAA, relying instead on voluntary employer compliance and referrals from 
Labor.121  If the same model is followed here, there will be little to no administrative burden 
placed on the IRS.  The risk, however, is that if employers begin to believe that 
noncompliance will never be punished via the excise tax, the excise tax may fail to achieve 
its compliance goal.  However, as discussed above, the mere possibility of a very large 
fine, imposed by the “fearsome” IRS,122 may be sufficient to achieve the desired employer 
behavior. 
C. Could We Lessen the IRS’s ACA Burden? 
The ACA significantly expands the IRS’s role in health care regulation, and it is 
far from obvious that placing such a burden on the agency is a wise policy decision.  This 
section will explore whether it might be possible to achieve the ACA’s policy goals in an 
efficient manner while lessening the role the IRS must play. 
The clearest justification for IRS involvement in ACA administration is based on 
the fact that the IRS is the most obvious choice for processing payments to or from large 
numbers of taxpayers.  Starting with the ACA’s payments to taxpayers, the ACA’s tax 
credits are calculated based on income, and the IRS obviously has the most readily 
available information on household income, along with pre-existing definitions of income 
that can be used for this purpose.  The scale of the premium tax credits also supports that 
argument that the IRS is better positioned than other agencies to handle administration, as 
many more individuals will be eligible for premium tax credits than for other pre-existing 
social welfare programs.  The IRS also has experience in making the types of calculations 
required for premium tax credit eligibility.  While calculation and payment of premium tax 
credits could clearly be given to a different agency, with HHS being the most obvious 
choice, the IRS would necessarily have to be involved in order to provide accurate income 
information.  But adding an additional agency would not seem to offer any efficiencies 
(other than perhaps making budget allocations easier to come by given the politically 
disfavored status the IRS currently enjoys). 
Similar reasoning supports IRS involvement in those areas of ACA administration 
that require payments from taxpayers to the federal government as part of the individual 
and employer mandates.  The amount of the individual mandate varies based on family size 
and income, both of which are readily available to the IRS.  And the employer mandate is 
based in part on employer size, again something the IRS already tracks.  In addition, the 
IRS obviously already has a procedure in place for collecting amounts due from the same 
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population, something no other federal agency can claim.  And finally, it is important to 
note that the IRS is required by constitutional limitations to be involved in the 
administration of the individual mandate.  The constitutionality of the individual mandate 
was, after all, upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing powers.123 
But what about the excise taxes imposed by the ACA?  The previous parts have 
established that excise taxes cannot be thought of as “pure tax” provisions.  They are 
distinct from our general income tax system and are not designed to raise revenue.  They 
function as compliance mechanisms in the case of section 9815 and as a cost-control 
mechanism in the case of the Cadillac tax.  But these provisions are likely to accomplish 
their goals without any active IRS enforcement, and in this sense appear to be highly 
efficient. 
The troublesome part of the excise taxes, from a tax administrative standpoint, is 
the rulemaking burden that comes along with the excise taxes.124  As Professor Hickman 
has documented, nearly ten percent of IRS rulemaking projects between 2008 and 2012 
were ACA-related tasks.125  However, many of these regulations do involve tasks or topics 
that are squarely within IRS expertise.  For example, rulemaking on how employees are to 
be counted and how employers are to be aggregated for purposes of the employer mandate 
are subjects with which the IRS has vast experience.  Similarly, rulemaking regarding the 
computation of individual mandate penalties, reconciliation and reporting requirements for 
the individual mandate are also standard IRS functions.  However, many other regulations 
appear to have no obvious relationship to either the tax system or IRS expertise.  IRS 
regulations have covered such diverse topics as the requirements for group health plans to 
(1) cover preventive services, including religious exemptions therefrom resulting from the 
Hobby Lobby decision, (2) comply with specific procedures when processing claims, (3) 
cover pre-existing health conditions, (4) not include certain lifetime and annual limits on 
benefits, (5) cover children through age 26, and (6) not rescind coverage except in specific 
circumstances.  It is in this health policy arena that I believe the strongest arguments can 
be made against IRS involvement.  Yet, the health policy regulations just mentioned were 
not promulgated solely by the IRS.  Because the group health plan requirements are 
codified in three statutes, they were jointly promulgated pursuant to the 1999 MOU by IRS, 
HHS, and Labor.  It is possible, therefore, that the IRS’s actual involvement in these health 
policy oriented regulations was minimal, with the IRS deferring to HHS’s lead—but no 
publicly available information confirms whether that intuition is accurate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The IRS is overburdened, and coming dangerously close to being unable to 
competently perform its core revenue-raising function.  Yet Congress continues to add to 
the IRS’s workload, most notably in recently years through the many tax-related provisions 
of the ACA.  While the IRS has always had a role to play in regulated employer-provided 
benefits, the ACA substantially expands that role.  This raises an obvious question of 
whether it is wise to give the IRS what appears to be a primary role in health plan 
regulation. 
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As this article has argued, however, much of the IRS’s involvement appears not 
only defensible but efficient.  For better or for worse, there is no better system for 
processing payments to or from a large number of taxpayers than the federal income tax 
system.  Additionally, using excise taxes to shape taxpayer behavior appears to offer the 
best of both worlds: a powerful incentive that requires very few enforcement resources.  
The only troubling aspect of the IRS’s involvement in ACA administration stems from the 
IRS’s broad rulemaking authority across a number of substantive health plan provisions.  
Why, after all, should it fall to the IRS to determine how to accommodate the religious 
freedoms of closely held corporations as they apply to the provision of contraceptives?  But 
we do not actually know the extent of IRS involvement in these and other health plan 
regulations, because three agencies jointly promulgate such rules.  There are, however, 
multiple steps we could take to ease our concerns both about the IRS’s expertise in such 
matters and the burden it imposes on an already struggling agency.  HHS, Labor, and IRS 
could renegotiate their MOU to make the IRS’s role explicitly more limited.  Or Congress 
could potentially take rulemaking authority away from the IRS, instead requiring IRS to 
follow the regulations issued by HHS and Labor. 
We may not like the role the IRS has come to play in health plan regulation, and 
we may fear that it makes little sense.  But the fault here lies not with any recent additions 
to the Code, but rather America’s long-standing tradition of having employers as the 
primary providers of health insurance and the provision of a tax benefit associated with 
such coverage.  Because the ACA was an attempt to achieve universal coverage through 
the existing employer-based system, the statute requires significant reliance on the tax 
system to achieve its goals.  And upon closer examination of the specifics of the ACA, 
there appears to be strong justification for most (but certainly not all) of its tax provisions. 
